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ABSTRACT 
 
JOSEPH J. P. SIMONS: Avoidance of Divisive Topics 
(Under the direction of Melanie Green) 
 
 
Existing research has shown that anticipating discussing socially divisive topics is associated 
with feeling threatened, both in terms of self reported emotion and automatic reactions (the dissensus 
effect). The current research aims to test two further hypotheses about this effect. First, given the 
proposed causal mechanism (that divisive topics are socially challenging, and hence discussing them 
conflicts with social goals), the effect should be stronger for participants who are more motivated to 
have positive interactions. Second, given that threat is an avoidant response, it is predicted that 
dissensus will lead people to think less about the topic in question when social considerations are 
salient. These hypotheses were tested across two studies. Both manipulated participants’ social goals 
(manipulated using subliminal priming in Study 1, and by a scrambled sentence task in Study 2) and 
then asked them to imagine discussing consensual or divisive topics (manipulated within-subjects 
using actual issues in Study 1, and between-subjects using fictional polling data in Study 2). Study 1 
measured participants’ affective responses to discussing the issues, whereas Study 2 measured the 
amount of thought about the issue.  Both studies also measured participants’ attachment styles (or 
internal working model of relationships). The first hypothesis received mixed support; across both 
studies, participants with more insecure attachment styles showed a stronger dissensus effect, but 
activating social goals did not have a comparable effect. The second hypothesis received very little 
support; while Study 2 found evidence that thinking about discussing a divisive (as opposed to 
consensual) issue leads participants to adopt less extreme attitudes and feel more ambivalence, there 
was no evidence for an effect on the amount of thought (or bias in this thought).  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of divided social opinion. As a social species living in 
a media rich society, it is hard to escape a constant stream of controversies, debates and 
disagreements. Opposing viewpoints are often only a channel change or mouse click away. Indeed, 
for many social issues, perhaps the most salient fact is that there is no social consensus – an 
individual may simply know that people disagree, without any real knowledge of what the 
considerations on each side are. Journalistic norms of fairness only exacerbate this phenomenon, as 
giving equal time to each side can create a false sense of equivalence between the sides and so make 
an issue appear more divided than it is.  
The current research attempts to elucidate some of the effects of this breakdown in consensus. 
Drawing from both the attitude and social motivation literature, I suggest that discussing divisive 
topics should be experienced as threatening, as these topics are disruptive to harmonious interpersonal 
relationships. Specifically, social division makes it harder to anticipate other people’s views, more 
difficult to tune messages to a specific audience, and increases the possibility of negative social 
outcomes. My previous research has demonstrated this effect in terms of self-reported threat and 
misperception of faces as threatening (Simons & Green, in preparation). In the current research, I aim 
to extend these findings by testing the causal mechanism and the effects of threat on attitudinal 
outcomes.  
 There are three parts to this introductory chapter. First, I will undertake a brief review of 
existing findings on the importance of consensus. Second, I will outline my relational approach to 
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understanding divided social opinion. Finally, I will describe research testing this model, including 
initial research in this line as well as the two studies which make up this dissertation.  
Prior literature: The importance of consensus 
 Social psychology has made it clear that a united social group can wield massive power over 
the individual. Possibly the most famous example is Asch’s line-judgment studies, in which 
participants were substantially more likely to give the wrong answer to an easy task when a number 
of confederates gave the wrong answer first (e.g., Asch, 1955). Notably, this effect was much reduced 
when at least one confederate broke the group consensus (even if they gave a different incorrect 
answer; Asch, 1955).  
 More recent research paradigms have continued to attest to the impact of consensus. The 
literature on attitudes and behavior has consistently demonstrated that so-called descriptive norms 
(perceptions of how widespread a behavior is) are a strong influence on whether people engage in that 
behavior themselves (Manning, 2009). Within the attitude literature, it has been shown that being 
within an attitudinally heterogenous group weakens opinions on social issues (e.g., Visser & 
Mirabile, 2004; Levitan & Visser, 2009). Within work on social influence, it has been shown that 
knowing one’s position is not shared by the majority of society leads to slower expression of attitudes 
(Bassili, 2003) and less positive affect (Lücken & Simon, 2005). Furthermore, people see such 
minority opinions as riskier than majority opinion (see Erb & Bohner, 2011, for a review). All these 
findings attest to the strong impact that consensual groups can have.    
It has been suggested that consensus is so compelling because it acts on two fundamental 
human motives (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Echterhoff, Higgins & Levine, 2009). On the one hand, 
people are motivated to create a stable and reliable understanding of the world (the epistemic motive). 
Consensual opinions can provide this stable understanding, especially for topics on which we are 
personally unsure. On the other hand, people also want to be accepted by and socially connected with 
those around them (the relational motive). Being in agreement with others can help people form and 
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maintain social bonds with others. Thus, following consensual opinions can help people be both 
accurate and accepted. 
The current research extends the previous literature by addressing the question of how people 
function when consensus has broken down. The research reviewed above shows that consensus has a 
strong influence on people, but assumes that there is a clear consensual / majority opinion in society. 
This is not the case for many pressing social issues. For topics such as legalized abortion, affirmative 
action, and drug legalization, it is hard to identify one side as being dominant. Rather, society seems 
more equally split, with each side having similar levels of support. In this regard, the opposite of a 
consensual topic is not a minority opinion, but rather an issue where there is an equal split of opinion. 
It is these divisive topics which are the focus of the current research.  
My fundamental contention is that issues which divide social opinion are disruptive to 
interpersonal interactions. That is to say, topics which are characterized by divided social opinion 
(divisive issues) present a challenge to smooth social interaction. For this reason, when social 
considerations are salient, people will try to avoid these topics. This avoidance will be reflected in 
their emotions and thought about the topic. These processes will be described in the following 
section.  
The dissensus effect: Divided opinions, social relationships and intellectual avoidance 
Divisive issues are socially disruptive for a number of interrelated reasons. First, they 
introduce interpersonal uncertainty into interactions. In daily life, it is safe for people to assume their 
interaction partners are against high unemployment, slavery, and nepotism, and conversely are in 
favor of equality, human rights and clean drinking water. However, in the absence of explicit 
information, it is hard for people to know where their interaction partners stand on divisive issues 
such as drug legalization, the Iraq war, or positive discrimination / affirmative action. Uncertainty 
reduction theory postulates that people are motivated to reduce such interpersonal certainty (Berger, 
1986), and it has been shown that uncertainty about a partner can lead to reduced performance on 
individual and co-operative tasks (Everly, Shih & Ho, 2012)  
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Second, social division makes it harder to tune messages to the audience. People adjust their 
utterances to be more conducive to the viewpoints of interaction partners (e.g., Echterhoff, Higgins, & 
Groll, 2005; Higgins, 1992; Higgins & Rholes, 1978). For topics where there is a clear majority 
opinion, this is a straightforward process; it is conversationally safe to construct messages which are 
implicitly anti-prejudice and pro-freedom, but harder to know what to say on topics such as legalized 
abortion or affirmative action.  
Finally, when talking about these issues, there is a greater risk of negative social outcomes. 
Misjudging one’s audience and saying the wrong thing is likely to lead to social shunning, which is a 
highly aversive state. A large body of literature attests to the fact that people do not want to interact 
with those who disagree with them. On the dyadic level, work on the attitude-similarity effect attests 
to the fact that individuals do not want to associate with those who hold opposed attitudes (e.g., 
Byrne, 1961; Byrne, Griffitt, Hudgins & Reeves, 1969; Condon & Crano, 1988; Montoya & Horton, 
2004; Singh, Yeo, Lin & Tan, 2007; Singh & Simons, 2010). On the group level, the stakes are even 
higher; if a person breaks the local group consensus, they are likely to find themselves excluded from 
the group (e.g., Schachter, 1951). Furthermore, it has been well established that being excluded leads 
to deeply felt negativity (see Williams & Nida 2011, for a review), and these effects hold even in 
highly artificial circumstances (e.g., being shunned by a computer; Zadro, Williams & Richardson, 
2004). Indeed, it has been proposed that belongingness is a basic human need (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995).  
To summarize, divisive issues place us in the middle of a social minefield. It is hard to know 
where is safe to step, and any mis-step could have severely unpleasant consequences. In the terms of 
Smith and Lazarus’s appraisal approach to emotions (e.g., Smith and Lazarus, 1993), the core 
relational theme is one of threat and danger. This may constitute an obstacle to the successful 
resolution to of these difficult issues; divisive topics are unlikely to be discussed in a calm and 
balanced fashion if the very topic is making people feel threatened.  
5 
The central hypothesis of the current research is that the demands of discussing divisive 
topics lead to an avoidant intellectual style (the dissensus effect). When anticipating talking about 
divisive topics, people should show a defensive and threatened mindset. As shown in Fig 1.1, this 
would manifest as a quadratic association between social opinion (or percentage of society in favor of 
a topic) and avoidant responding. Topics which are at the extreme high or low end of the social 
opinion scale (those which are widely agreed to be good or bad respectively) should be comparatively 
unthreatening and associated with low levels of avoidance. Those in the middle of the scale (i.e., 
those which show more division in social opinion) should be more threatening and be associated with 
higher levels of avoidance. This effect should manifest both in terms of affect and cognition.  
Affective consequences. The avoidant intellectual style should be manifest in a number of 
emotional reactions. Fundamentally, people should show emotions consistent with danger and a 
desire to remove oneself from the situation. Most centrally, we predict that the challenges posed by 
divided social opinion mean divisive topics will give rise to feelings of threat and anxiety (Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993). Furthermore, people should show less interest towards these topics, as interest is 
associated with an approach reaction (Silvia, 2008).   
Cognitive consequences. One aspect of the avoidance response is that, when social 
considerations are salient, people will show less thought about the topic. If a topic has unpleasant 
associations, it seems reasonable to assume people will not want to spend as much time and effort 
thinking about it (assuming that discussions about it are avoidable; Green, Visser & Tetlock, 2000). 
In the terms of the elaboration-likelihood model, their motivation to think about the topic is low. This 
avoidance tendency is important for a wide variety of phenomena, as the amount of thought people 
invest in a topic is a determinant of how strongly they hold opinions on that topic (attitude strength; 
e.g., Barden & Petty, 2008). Hence, it is to be expected that people will think less about topics which 
divide social opinion, and so will show less developed and weaker viewpoints on these topics.   
However, a second aspect of the avoidance response is that people’s thought may also be 
biased. One way to avoid thinking about a divisive topic is to try to come to an answer quickly, so 
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that no further thought is required. This desire to reach any firm answer is referred to as the need for 
closure, and has been linked to a confirmatory cognitive style (choosing an answer and then 
processing information to support that answer; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Put simply, in the rush 
to get to an answer, people will simply choose a side and then generate reasons to believe this side is 
correct rather than weighing up evidence in a balanced fashion. This process has been termed “seizing 
and freezing” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). On this basis, it is to be expected that people will 
generate more one-sided thoughts and show more univalent beliefs about a topic if they believe it to 
be divisive.  
For the sake of clarity, it is important to distinguish the current topic of investigation from a 
number of closely related ideas. Divisive issues raise a number of important research questions, and 
link to a variety of existing literatures. The current research highlights one strand of this tapestry. This 
focus is not meant to deny the importance of related topics, but rather to provide a tractable research 
domain. In particular, it is important to highlight that the current research is focused on the individual 
level of analysis, emphasizes divided opinions rather than divided information, and is concerned with 
the impact of disagreement between others rather than disagreement between the self and others.   
Individual focus. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, the current research takes the 
individual (as opposed to dyads or small groups) as the unit of analysis. Given the emphasis on 
relational factors, it is important to keep sight of this point. Analyses which take dyads or small 
groups as the unit of analysis can also offer important insights. This value can be seen, for example, 
in the literature on deep diversity in work teams (e.g., Mohammed & Angell, 2004). However, the 
current work focuses on the individual, as it seems a greater understanding of individual responses 
will help elucidate the specific psychological challenges that opinion diversity poses, which in turn 
will inform our understanding of how such diversity impacts dyads and groups.  
Opinion inconsistency. Second, the current research examines the effects of divided opinions 
rather than divided information. The focus is on knowing that society is split, rather than knowing 
arguments on each side of a topic. These two things may sometimes go together, but are not perfectly 
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associated. For example, an individual may know historical arguments for slavery, and so would have 
divided information on a very consensual topic. Similarly, complex political or scientific issues are 
often presented as highly divided, leaving most people in the situation of knowing that there is social 
division without really having knowledge of either side of the topic. 
A corollary of this point is that there are also other aspects of controversy beyond simple 
divided opinion which will not be investigated here. For example, controversial topics often involve 
attitudes which are strong, emotionally based, and linked to moral convictions. Again, the current 
analysis is not meant to deny the importance of these factors, but rather to highlight the significance 
of divided opinion in isolation. Further research can build on this foundation to look at the difference 
between moral and practical controversies, for example.  
Other-other inconsistency. Finally, the current work looks at the impact of knowing that 
others do not agree with one another, not learning that others disagree with you personally. This 
distinction can be summarized as the difference between other-other inconsistency and self-other 
inconsistency. In cases where people have already-formed attitudes, then both factors may be 
relevant; in learning about how much others agree with one another, we are also learning about how 
much they agree with us. However, in situations where the opinions of others are very salient but we 
have no well-formed opinion ourselves, other-other inconsistency is going to be the only important 
factor. That is to say, we will be very aware of how much other people agree with one another, but the 
question of how much they agree with us is not relevant.  
Arguably, this combination of highly salient social dissensus without a strong personal 
attitude characterizes much of people’s lives; social networks, including media outlets and the 
internet, mean that people become aware of controversies far faster than they can come to a personal 
opinion on them. Furthermore, some attitude theories suggest that many of our attitudes may actually 
be temporary constructions rather than stored representations (e.g., Schwartz, 2007). This line of 
thought would suggest that we are constantly constructing our personal opinions, and as such, self-
other inconsistency may not be as chronically relevant as may otherwise be thought.  
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Existing studies and the current research 
Initial data has proved supportive of the model outlined above. I have conducted two studies 
that provide validation for the idea that divisive topics induce a threat response (Simons & Green, in 
preparation). The first used a self-report methodology, the second an implicit measure. 
In the self-report study, participants rated 60 social issues on their personal attitude (i.e., 
whether they were in favor of it) and perceived social approval (i.e., the % of society they thought 
were in favor of it), and then indicated how much discussing each one would make them feel 
threatened, anxious, interested and relaxed. In line with predictions, there was a quadratic dissensus 
effect in threat and anxiety, such that topics in the middle of the spectrum (i.e., those which divide 
social opinion) showed higher levels of these emotions. This dissensus effect remained significant 
when controlling for individual attitude position and extremity, suggesting the effect is driven by 
social opinion rather than correlated differences in attitudes.  Thus, even though people tend to be 
closer to neutral on divisive issues, this confound is not sufficient to explain the effect of social 
division.  
The second study used a misattribution procedure to test how the divisiveness of issues 
affected perceptions of others. Participants were rapidly presented with social issues as primes, 
followed by emotionally neutral faces. Their task was to classify the faces as either threatening or 
non-threatening. The issues were taken from the previous study and chosen on the basis of the social 
approval ratings. They were grouped in three categories: widely popular (those with the highest social 
approval ratings), widely unpopular (those with the lowest social approval ratings), and divisive 
(those in the middle of the approval spectrum). Again, both a linear and quadratic trend were found, 
such that less popular topics were generally associated with more attribution of threat, but divisive 
topics were higher than would be predicted from this linear trend alone.  
Furthermore, participants also completed control trials, whereby they classified the faces as 
pleasant or unpleasant. The effects on attributions of threat remained significant controlling for the 
effects of attributions on unpleasantness, ruling out an explanation in terms of general negative 
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facilitation. That is to say, the effect of social division on threat responding cannot be reduced to a 
general effect on any negative response. Thus, the threat response can be detected using more 
automatic measures, can affect people’s perceptions of others, and cannot be explained as a broad 
facilitation of any negatively-valenced response. 
These existing studies provide good evidence for the affective component of the dissensus 
effect. Across two very different outcome measures, there is evidence that divisive topics are 
associated with greater feelings of threat and anxiety than more consensual topics.  
However, these findings leave open two major questions, which are the focus of the current 
research. First, are the effects found really driven by the proposed social factors (i.e., concern about 
ostracism) as opposed to alternative mechanisms (e.g., the difficulty of making sense of conflicting 
viewpoints)? Second, does social division have the predicted effects on cognition? These questions 
are examined across two studies, and the effects to be tested are shown graphically in Figure 1.2.  
The first study examines whether the increased threat response toward divisive topics is the 
result of social concerns. The study is based around the reasoning that if these are socially-motivated 
effects, they should be stronger when participants have active goals to affiliate with others. Affiliation 
goals are manipulated using an established subliminal priming procedure (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), 
both prior to and during the experimental task. Under the guise of a reaction-time task, participants 
are exposed to either social or neutral words. These words are presented sufficiently quickly that 
participants are not consciously able to read them. Participants then rate how much discussing the 
various social issues would make them feel. It is predicted that the divisive topics will be associated 
with a greater level of anxiety, and that this effect will be stronger when participants have had their 
social goals activated in the priming task.  
The second study tests both the effects outlined above; does social division lead to more 
cognitive avoidance, and is this effect facilitated by activating social goals? Goal activation is 
manipulated using a scrambled sentence task (Cook & Bird, 2011). Participants are then briefed that 
they will be generating arguments on the topic of direct-to-consumer drug advertisements (i.e., 
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whether drug companies should be allowed to advertise directly to the public). After an initial attitude 
measure, they are given some information about considerations on each side of the topic and told 
what proportion of society is in favor of the advertisements (the consensus manipulation: either 20%, 
50% or 80%). They then list up to ten arguments which people on either side of the topic could use in 
a discussion, and complete both a final attitude scale and a number of measures of attitude strength.  
If our model is correct, participants in the divided opinion condition should show less thought about 
the issue. This will manifest itself as generation of fewer arguments, especially on the counter-
attitudinal side. Again, these effects should be stronger when the priming procedure is used to make 
social goals more salient. 
In both studies, participants also complete a measure of adult attachment, or internal working 
model of relationships (the Relationship Questionnaire; Griffin & Barthomolew, 1994). Specifically, 
participants rate how well four relationship prototypes match the way they tend to relate to others 
(e.g., I am comfortable without close relationships. It is very important to me to feel independent and 
self-sufficient, and I prefer not to depend on others or have others depend on me). These four ratings 
are then transformed into scores on two dimensions: the self-model, or how worthy of affection the 
person views themselves as being; and the other-model, or how available and responsive they see 
others as being. The attachment measure provides an alternate way of operationalizing social 
motivation; just as participants who have their social goals activated will be more motivated to have 
positive interactions, so will participants who are dispositionally insecure in their relationships with 
others. As such, participants who show a more insecure attachment style should also show a stronger 
dissensus effect. Thus, this measure was included as a complement to the goal priming procedure.    
Summary 
The current research examines a relational model of responses to divided social opinion. On 
the basis that diverse opinions are disruptive to interpersonal relationships, it is proposed that divisive 
topics induce an avoidant mindset, characterized by emotions such as anxiety and cognitive effects 
such as reduced thought. Initial data has provided support for the idea that divisive topics are 
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associated with a threat response. The current research aims to show that this effect is exacerbated by 
active social goals and has important cognitive consequences. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
Study 1: Social goals and affective responses 
  
Aims 
The main goal of this study was to establish moderation of the dissensus effect by social 
motivation. The proposed causal mechanism for the dissensus effect is that divisive topics are 
interpersonally disruptive, and hence discussing these topics conflicts with the motivation to have 
positive interactions. If this mechanism is correct, the effect should be stronger for those who are 
more motivated to have positive interactions. This hypothesis was tested in two ways; directly 
manipulating goals (using a subliminal priming procedure) and measuring attachment style (on the 
reasoning that those with less secure attachment will be more motivated to have a positive 
interaction). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 144 undergraduates (103 female, 41 males; M age = 18.6, SD = 1.13), who 
received partial course credit. 
Procedure 
The study followed a 2 (goal prime: social vs. neutral) x 3 (social opinion: unpopular vs. 
divisive vs. popular) design, with repeated measures on the final factor. Participants completed an 
initial subliminal priming task, and then rated 30 social issues in terms of how anxious, interested, 
and good they would feel while discussing them. To reinforce the priming manipulation, the primes 
from the initial task were subliminally re-presented between items. Participants then completed a 
13 
manipulation check, gave their attitudes on the issues, and filled out a number of personality and 
demographic questionnaires.  
Materials  
Goal priming task. This subliminal priming task was based on Lakin & Chartrand (2003). 
The task was presented as a test of visual acuity and response speed. Participants were instructed to 
fixate on a point in the center of the screen, and indicate whether they saw a flash of light on the left 
or right hand of the screen. A prime word was then rapidly presented in one of the corners of the 
screen for 60msec, then replaced by a visual mask for a further 60msec. Participants completed a total 
of 80 trials. In the social goal priming condition, the prime words used were affiliate, friend, partner, 
and together. In the neutral condition, they were neutral and background. The visual mask 
XQFBZRMQWGBX was used in both conditions. Each prime word was presented an equal number of 
times in each corner (i.e., five times in the social-goal condition, ten times in the neutral condition), 
and the order of trials was randomized for each participant. To maintain the appearance of a reaction 
time task, a random interval of 1-3 seconds was inserted between trials.  
Issue stimuli. A set of 30 issues were used (10 unpopular, 10 divisive and 10 popular), 
derived from the previous studies. Of the 60 issues used in the self-report study described in the 
introduction, 30 were selected on the basis of perceived social opinion ratings. Specifically, the 
popular issues were those with social opinion rating closest to 100% (e.g., human rights, free speech), 
the divisive ones were those with social opinion ratings closest to the median (e.g., affirmative action, 
legalizing marijuana), and the unpopular were those with the lowest social approval ratings (air 
pollution, racial prejudice). The full set of stimuli is given in Table 2.1, and is the same set used in 
the facial misattribution study described in the introduction.  
Isssue rating task. Participants completed three blocks of ratings. In each block, they were 
presented with the 30 social issues, one at a time and in a random order. Participants indicated their 
affective response to discussing each issue using a 4-point scale running from very relaxed to very 
anxious (threat ratings; block A), very interested to very indifferent (interest ratings; block B), and 
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very good to very bad (negativity ratings; block C). The order of blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants. The anxiety and interest ratings provided the main DVs, and the negativity ratings 
provided a valenced control. There was no response deadline, but each issue was displayed for a 
maximum of 1 sec. Participants responded using the q, w, o and p keys (with the positive anchors on 
the left). Each block consisted of twelve practice ratings, followed by 30 experimental ratings. To 
encourage participants to focus on the issues, the rating scale was only presented on the first 6 
practice trials of each block. In order to reinforce the goal priming manipulation, the prime words 
from the initial task were re-presented between trials. Specifically, the prime words were presented in 
the centre of the screen for 20msec, and replaced by the visual mask for 20msec.
1
     
Manipulation check. To test the efficacy of the social goal manipulation, participants rated 
how much they felt happy, joyful, social and outgoing. These were rated on 7-point scales, anchored 
with not at all and very much so. The final two give a measure of social goal activation, whereas the 
first two provide a valence-matched control.   
Attitude position. Participants indicated their attitude on each issue using five-point scales 
(very much against, somewhat against, neutral, somewhat in favor, very much in favor).   
Personality measure and demographics. Participants completed a measure of attachment 
style, the Relationship Questionnaire (Griffin & Barthomolew, 1994).
2
 Participants also completed a 
number of demographic measures, including free-response items assessing awareness of the primes.  
Results 
Analytic strategy  
 The analysis addressed three key hypotheses. First, there should be a dissensus effect on 
threat (i.e., divisive topics should be more threatening than consensual ones), and this effect should be 
stronger when social goals are active (i.e., when social goals are primed, or for people who are 
insecurely attached). Second, there should be a reverse dissensus effect on interest (i.e., divisive 
topics should be less interesting than consensual ones). Third, the effects of social opinion should not 
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be explicable in terms of individual attitudes or general negativity. As such, the effects should remain 
controlling for attitudes or general negative feelings when discussing the topics.    
In the current study, social opinion was manipulated within-subjects (meaning that each 
participant rated popular, divisive, and unpopular issues). As such, each participant’s residuals may 
not be independent. Furthermore, as priming and the attachment style variables vary at the participant 
level, the hypotheses above imply interactions across levels; a within-subject effect being moderated 
by between-subject variables. Both of these issues were addressed by analyzing the data using a 
multilevel model, which explicitly models within-subjects effects and hence can accommodate both 
non-independent data points and cross-level interactions.  
More specifically, for each of the issue ratings (anxiety and interest), a series of three models 
was fitted. Model 1 simply examined the effects of social opinion and attitude position (without any 
reference to social goals). Model 2 examined the additional effects of priming condition and its 
interactions with social opinion and attitude position. Finally, Model 3 included the two dimensions 
of attachment style (but not priming condition) and their interactions with social opinion and attitude 
position. Hence, Model 1 examined the basic effects, whereas Models 2 and 3 examined for 
moderation by social goals (operationalized in two separate ways).
3 
Three separate versions of each of these models were run to examine the effects of 
controlling for alternate explanations. Version A simply contained the effects of social opinion (and 
interactions with the social motivation moderators). Version B added the effects of individual 
attitudes (plus interactions with social motivation moderators). Finally, Version C added the general 
negativity ratings as a control. Interactions between social opinion and attitudinal variables were 
deliberately not included in the model, due to the high level of collinearity between these variables.  
Random effects were allowed on all the within-subjects effects. Allowing correlations on the 
random effects led to convergence issues, and so they were forced to be orthogonal. Reduced 
information maximum likelihood estimation was used as an estimation method.  
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Data coding 
 Social opinion. Codes were assigned to the unpopular / divisive / popular issues in order to 
capture the linear popularity effect (i.e., whether a greater the level of social support for an issue was 
associated with more anxiety and/or interest; codes -1, 0, 1) and quadratic dissensus effect (i.e., 
whether social division was associated with more anxiety and/or interest; codes -1, 2, -1). These 
variables were then entered as predictors in the subsequent models. Note that these are coded such 
that a positive popularity effect reflects higher levels of the outcome for popular issues, and a positive 
dissensus effect indicates higher levels of the outcome for divisive issues. 
 Attitudes. Attitude scores were centred on the mid-point of the scale (such that they ranged 
from -2 to 2, with a 0 representing neutrality). This variable was included as a score of attitude 
position. The scores were also squared to give a quadratic term, which in turn was multiplied by -1 (to 
score it in the same direction as the social opinion effects). This quadratic term was used as a measure 
of attitude extremity. The decision to use a quadratic term (rather than distance from the midpoint) is 
so that the extremity variable would be an appropriate control for the dissensus effect in social 
opinion (which is also a quadratic effect).  Note that a positive attitude position effect represents an 
increased level of the outcome for issues which the participant is more in favor of, whereas a positive 
extremity effect represents a higher level of the outcome for neutral attitudes. As such, the attitude 
extremity variable would perhaps be more accurately named “attitude neutrality”, but this term would 
prove confusing in use.          
Manipulation check: Did the prime lead to greater self-reported sociality?  
 The two items assessing self-reported social feelings were highly correlated (r = .86, p < 
.001), and hence were averaged to form a measure of sociality. Similarly, the two items assessing 
positive affect were highly correlated (r = .75, p < .001), and were averaged to form a measure of 
positivity. The two resulting scores were highly correlated (r = .62, p < .001). Participants reported a 
higher level of sociality in the neutral-prime control condition (M = 4.51) than in the social-prime 
condition (M = 4.26). A linear regression revealed this effect to be non-significant, B = -0.25, p = .24, 
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and it remained non-significant controlling for self-reported positivity, B = -0.24, p = .15. The prime 
also did not affect ratings of positivity, either examined alone, B = -0.01, p = .96, or controlling for 
sociality, B = 0.15, p = .39. As such, there was no evidence that the social goal prime increased self-
reported sociality or positivity. In fact, for sociality, the means were in the opposite direction, 
although this difference was non-significant.    
Anxiety effects: Did social division increase anxiety?   
Analysis was conducted on data from 143 participants (one participant failed to complete the 
anxiety rating task). The results are given in Table 2.1, and plotted in Figure 2.1. As can be seen, 
there was a robust dissensus effect, which remained even controlling for attitude extremity and 
general negativity. This main effect was significant for eight of the nine analyses, and marginally 
significant in the remaining one (Model 2, Version A). Consistent with predictions, there was also a 
significant cross-level interaction between dissensus and the self-model of attachment, such that 
participants with an insecure attachment style showed a stronger threat response to the divisive topics. 
There was no moderating effect of the priming manipulation on the dissensus effect. 
There is also a question as to whether the more complex models (i.e. Model 2 and 3) have 
any greater explanatory power than the simpler Model 1. It is notable that, regardless of which 
controls are in the model, adding either set of social motivation variables does not lead to a decrease 
in the residual variance and actually increases the AIC and BIC (suggesting worse fit given the 
degrees of freedom). These results suggest that adding the social motivation predictors may be 
making the analysis more complex without adding to its explanatory ability. To test this possibility, 
version C of all three models was re-run using full information maximum likelihood estimation 
(FIML; allowing comparison of models with different fixed effects). Likelihood ratio tests were then 
used to compare the fit of Model 1C with both Model 2C and 3C. These tests revealed that the prime-
as-moderator model was not significantly better than the no-moderator model, χ2(5) = 3.32, p = .50. 
However, the attachment-moderator model was significantly better than the no-moderator model, 
18 
χ2(10) = 27.16, p = .002. Hence, adding the attachment predictors seems to add to the fit of the model, 
but adding the prime did not.  
Interest effects: Did social division suppress interest? 
 Analysis was conducted on data from 141 participants (the others failed to complete the 
interest rating task). The results are given in Table 2.2. As can be seen, the dissensus effect fluctuated 
depending on which controls were in the model. In all three models, there was the predicted negative 
dissensus effect (i.e., divisive topics were less interesting to discuss) when there were no controls in 
the analysis. When the attitudinal variables were entered into this analysis, this effect became non-
significant (suggesting that it is in fact attitude extremity, rather than social consensus, which was 
driving the initial effect). Finally, when general negativity was also entered, there was a marginally 
significant positive consensus effect. This suggests a suppressor effect; social division renders topics 
more interesting to talk about, but also increases general negativity about discussing the topic which 
reduces interest. This effect is, however, only marginal and did not emerge when prime condition was 
included in the analysis (i.e., in Model 2).  
There was no evidence for moderation of the dissensus effect by social motivation, regardless 
of whether this was operationalized as attachment style or through the goal manipulation. None of the 
relevant fixed effects were significant. Furthermore, as with the analysis of anxiety, adding the social 
motivation predictors did not reduce the residual variance and actually increased the AIC and BIC. 
Repeating the model-testing procedure from the first analysis (i.e., re-running version C of each 
model using FIML estimation and conducting likelihood ratio tests) revealed that neither the prime-
moderator not the attachment-moderator models were a significantly better fit than Model 1, χ2s(5, 
10) = 3.86, 12.84, ps = .57, .23 respectively. 
Discussion 
 This study provided a replication and extension of the previous self-report findings on the 
dissensus effect. First, it replicated the basic effect (that divisive topics were more threatening than 
consensual ones), and the finding that this effect could not be explained through correlated 
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differences in attitudes. Second, it demonstrated that, as with the facial misattribution study, the 
dissensus effect was not simply general negative facilitation; the effect emerged even controlling for 
other negative responses. Third, consistent with the proposed causal mechanism, the dissensus effect 
was stronger for people with insecure attachment styles. Specifically, people who showed insecurity 
on the self-model dimension showed greater anxiety at the thought of discussing divisive topics.  
The findings on interest were somewhat more complex than predicted. There was a notable 
reversed dissensus effect (such that divisive topics were less interesting, as predicted). However, 
unlike the effects in anxiety, controlling for attitudes eliminated this effect. This finding is more 
consistent with the real causal factor being attitude extremity; people are most interested in discussing 
topics on which they have extreme views. Furthermore, controlling for general negativity gave some 
hint of a suppressor effect; social division actually promotes interest, but also a general sense of 
negativity (which reduces interest). This finding is consistent with work on the appraisal pattern of 
interest, which highlights that complexity is a key precursor of interest (e.g., Silvia, 2008). However, 
this effect was only marginal in the current study, and hence should not be over-interpreted.  
Perhaps the most notable feature of this study was the failure of the social goal manipulation 
to intensify the dissensus effect. This is surprising, given that the adult attachment measure showed 
the predicted pattern of moderation. There are at least two different explanations for this. On the one 
hand, this could be a genuine null effect, and social goal activation does not have the predicted effect. 
On the other hand, it could simply be that, within the context of this study, the priming task was not 
sufficiently strong to activate participants’ goals. Consistent with this latter explanation, the 
manipulation did not have widespread effects on the outcomes, and for neither DV was the prime-
moderated model a better fit than the non-moderated model.  
Furthermore, the prime did not affect self-reported sociality, although this null effect could 
simply be due to implicit goal manipulations effects bypassing conscious intentions (e.g., Aarts, 
Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001; Eitam, 
Hassin & Schul, 2008). That is to say, even if the prime was effective, it may not affect participants’ 
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conscious motivations and hence may not be susceptible to self report. In an attempt to resolve this 
issue, a different goal activation task was used in the second study.  
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Endnotes 
1
Due to unforeseen technical issues, the presentation of these stimuli actually occurred for a range of 
timings (from 7 to 42 msec, with values in the mid-30s being most common). This variability in 
presentation times raises concerns about whether some participants were able to read the prime 
words. It should be noted that the procedure had been tested by the experimenter before being run on 
participants without raising concerns about legibility, and hence the primes were not clearly 
supraliminal. However, as an additional precaution, the analyses were repeated without the six 
participants who successfully named one of the primes in a final open-ended response (asking them to 
name any words they had been able to read). Specifically, the most complex version of each model 
(Version C) and the test of the manipulation check were re-run on this reduced dataset.  Removing 
these participants did not alter the findings substantially. The only noteworthy change was that the 
main effect of dissensus on interest moved from marginal significance to non-significance in Models 
1 & 3. Thus, when controlling for general negativity, there was no evidence for dissensus promoting 
interest. This change is most likely due to a general reduction in power, rather than the effect being 
driven by awareness of the primes; the effect was marginal in the full dataset, the change occurred in 
the versions of the model which did not include priming condition as a predictor, and there is not a 
plausible causal pathway from awareness of the prime to the effect. 
 
2
Due to an oversight, the initial forced-choice item was omitted from this scale. A number of other 
potentially relevant constructs were also measured; a novel eight-item measure of self-reported 
sensitivity to controversy (given in Table 2.4), an 18-item scale assessing the tendency to appraise 
difficulties as challenges vs. threats (the Cognitive Appraisal Scale, CAS; Skinner & Brewer, 2002), 
and a scale of dispositional loneliness (the SELSA-S; DiTommaso, Brannen & Best, 2004). In terms 
of anxiety outcomes, these either failed to moderate the dissensus effect (controversy sensitivity and 
the SELSA-S) or followed the same patters as attachment (CAS; threat appraisals intensified the 
dissensus effect). In terms of interest, using any as a moderator replicated the marginally significant 
dissensus effect when controlling for both attitudes and general negativity. In general, these scales did 
not moderate the dissensus effect in interest; the only evidence was a marginally significant tendency 
for the Family subscale of the SELSA-S to decrease the effect. As these measures did not have 
particularly noteworthy effects, they will not be discussed in more detail. 
 
3
This analysis did not test for interaction effects between the priming manipulation and the 
attachment style variables. Such effects would not bear strongly on our conclusions, and would add 
substantially to the complexity of the models to be fitted.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
Study 2: Social goals and cognitive responses 
 
Aims 
 The previous study replicated the dissensus effect and found the predicted moderation by 
attachment style. However, so far there has been no evidence for the predicted moderation by social 
goal activation or effects on attitude strength outcomes. The current study provided a further test of 
these two hypotheses. First, an alternate goal activation procedure was used (a scrambled sentence 
task). Second, a test of effects of social division on private thinking was constructed, which assessed 
participants’ cognitive response while keeping social interactions salient in their mind.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 147 participants were recruited through two routes. The main body were 
undergraduates, recruited through the participant pool (n = 136; male = 79, female = 57; M age = 
20.0, SD = 5.51). However, the study was also advertised via flyers in the psychology building, 
offering $5 financial compensation for completing the study. This second recruitment method 
returned a smaller group (n = 11; male = 3, female = 8; M age = 22.5, SD = 7.18). The two groups 
were combined to form one sample.    
Procedure 
The study followed a 2 (goal prime: social vs. individual) x 3 (issue framing: unpopular vs. 
divisive vs. popular) design. Participants were briefed that the study was investigating responses to 
the issue of direct-to-consumer drug advertisements. Initially, social vs. independent goals were 
activated using a scrambled sentence task. Subsequently, participants completed an initial attitude 
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scale and read some information about the issue, giving a sample of arguments on each side and 
(fictional) information about social opinion on the advertisements. They then completed an adapted 
thought listing task, in which they imagined two people discussing the issue and listing arguments 
which could be used on either side. This task was intended to measure their thoughts while keeping 
social considerations salient. Finally, participants completed a measure of final attitudes and attitude 
strength, and personality and demographic questionnaires. 
Materials 
Goal priming task. A scrambled sentence task was used to activate participants’ social goals. 
The task was taken from Cook and Bird (2011). Participants were presented with a series of lists of 
five words, and had to generate a four-word grammatical sentence from each. Participants completed 
two practice trials, followed by 36 priming trials. They key manipulation was that in the social-goal 
condition 24 of the priming trials contained words relating to social relationships (e.g., friend, 
sharing), whereas in the independent-goal condition 24 of the trials contained words related to 
independence (e.g., private, separate). A full list of sentences is given in Table 3.1.  
Initial attitude. Following the goal priming task, participants were given a brief outline of 
what is meant by direct-to-consumer drug advertisements and asked to indicate their initial attitude 
position. This was measured using a six-point scale with no neutral option (very much against, 
somewhat against, mildly against, mildly in favor, somewhat in favor, very much in favor).  
Briefing and issue framing manipulation. After giving their attitudes, participants read a short 
briefing on the issue. This text drew attention to the widespread nature of drug advertisements, and 
gave a short summary of an argument on each side of the issue (the ads serve a public information 
function vs. the ads encourage decisions based on emotional factors). Most importantly, the briefing 
also contained the issue framing manipulation, a claim that polling indicated that two, five, or eight in 
ten Americans were in favor of the advertisements (the unpopular, divisive, and popular conditions 
respectively). To ensure that this information was attended to, participants subsequently completed 
three multiple choice comprehension questions. These asked participants to identify the name of the 
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issue to be discussed, what is meant by that issue, and finally the percentage of society in favor of the 
advertisements. The briefing was then re-presented, to allow participants to check any information 
they were not clear on.     
Argument listing task. The argument-listing task was designed to be a variation on a thought-
listing task which would keep social concerns salient to participants. The task is loosely based on the 
procedure used in Kenworthy, Hewstone, Levine, Martin, and Willis (2008, Study 3). Participants 
were asked to imagine two people discussing the topic of direct-to-consumer drug advertisements, 
and to think of arguments each side could use. They entered up to 10 arguments (in any order). They 
then indicated whether each argument suggested the advertisements were a good or bad idea (or had 
no implications either way). The number of arguments generated was used as a measure of the 
amount of thought, and the proportion which support the participants’ own attitude provided a 
measure of confirmatory thinking.
1
  
Final attitude scales. After completing the argument-listing task, participants completed the 
same attitude scale as at the beginning of the study (to test whether the argument-listing task changed 
attitudes). They also completed a number of measures of attitude strength. Scales of potential and 
subjective ambivalence were adapted from Preister and Petty (1996).  Potential ambivalence measures 
the degree to which participants hold simultaneous positive and negative evaluations of the attitude 
object. This was assessed by collecting separate positivity and negativity ratings of direct-to-
consumer advertisements (e.g., Take a moment to just think of the GOOD things about direct-to-
consumer drug advertisements. Ignore all the bad things about them. How positive are these good 
things?). These were rated on 7-point scales, anchored with not at all and extremely. These separate 
ratings were combined using the similarity-intensity model (i.e., the average of the two evaluations 
minus the difference between them) to give a single value indicating simultaneous positive and 
negative evaluations. This ambivalence figure could hence range from -2 to 7. Subjective 
ambivalence (the feeling of tension between positive and negative evaluations) was assessed with 
three items, asking participants to what extent their thoughts and feelings on the topic were mixed, 
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conflicted and indecisive. Participants’ attitude certainty was assessed using Petrocelli, Tormala, and 
Rucker’s (2007) scale, which contains four items assessing attitude clarity (e.g., To what extent is 
your true attitude toward direct-to-consumer drug advertising clear in your mind?) and three 
assessing attitude correctness (e.g., How certain are you that your attitude toward direct-to-consumer 
drug advertising is the correct attitude to have?). The subjective ambivalence and certainty items 
were all rated on 9-point scales, anchored with not at all and very much.   
Manipulation check and personality measure. As in Study 1, participants were asked to 
indicate how much they felt happy, joyful, social and outgoing, allowing a check on the efficacy of 
the social goal prime (and a control for positive valence). Dispositional social orientation was 
assessed using the same five-item attachment style scale as in previous studies (the Relationship 
Questionnaire; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994).
2
 Finally, participants completed a range of 
demographic questions, and were asked if they thought anything they had been told was false and if 
they had any other comments about the study (both assessed with open-ended text responses). 
Results 
Analytic strategy 
 Rather than entering participants’ initial attitude position and the issue framing manipulation 
as separate predictors, these variables were combined into a single social support variable reflecting 
whether social opinion was opposed to or supportive of participants’ viewpoints. Participants were 
classified into those who started with positive vs. negative attitudes towards the advertisements (the 
scale used did not have a neutral point). For participants with a positive attitude, the popular condition 
was coded as supportive and the unpopular condition as opposing. For participants with a negative 
attitude the opposite held; the unpopular condition was coded as supportive and the popular condition 
as opposing. The divisive condition was coded as divided for all participants. As in previous analyses, 
contrast coding was used to decompose the overall effect of this variable (opposing, divisive, 
supportive) into linear (-1, 0,1) and quadratic (-1,2,-1) terms. In this case, the linear term reflects the 
effect of increasing social support for the participants’ attitudes (the opinion support effect), and as 
26 
before, the quadratic term reflects the effect of social opinion being divided rather than consensual 
(the dissensus effect).   
Thus, there are three separate groups of predictors. The first group is the social support 
variables (containing the opinion support and dissensus effects). The second group is the social 
motivation predictors: the goal prime manipulation, and the attachment style variable. As in Study 1, 
these two were treated as separate operationalizations of social motivation, and were not used 
simultaneously. Rather, different versions of the analyses were conducted using each one. While it is 
possible that the effects of social goal activation are moderated by attachment style, the current design 
is not designed to look for these interactions and entering them would render the analyses unfeasibly 
complex. The third and final predictor is attitude extremity. To maintain comparability with previous 
studies, this was calculated as the square of initial attitude position (although the results are 
substantially the same if absolute distance from the midpoint is used).   
For each DV, a series of regression models was fitted. The first simply included the main 
effects of the social support and social motivation variables. The second allowed for the interaction 
between social support and social motivation. The third introduced attitude extremity as a control for 
social support (and hence allowed for a main effect and interaction with social motivation). Finally, 
the fourth model tested whether attitude extremity moderated the effect of social support, social 
motivation, or their interaction. Two versions of these analyses were conducted; the first used the 
priming manipulation as an operationalization of social motivation, and the second used the two 
attachment style variables. The full results are given in Tables 3.2-3.7. 
Manipulation check: Did the prime lead to greater self-reported sociality? 
 As in Study 1, the two self-reported sociality items showed a high level of correlation (r = 
.78, p < .001), as did the two self-reported positivity items (r = .86,  p < .001). The resulting sociality 
and positivity scales were also correlated (r = .59, p < .001) Participants reported higher levels of 
sociality following the social goal prime (M = 4.73) than the individual goal primes (M = 4.68). This 
effect was not significant, B = 0.05, p = .83, and remained non-significant controlling for self-
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reported positivity, B = .05, p = .75. Additionally, the prime did not significantly affect reported 
positivity, either considered alone, B = -0.01, p = .94, or controlling for reported sociality, B = -0.01, 
p = .80. As such, there was no evidence that the goal prime lead to greater self-reported sociality or 
positivity.  
Dissensus effects: Did split social opinion lead to less thought, more bias, and weaker attitudes? 
There was not a clear dissensus effect across the DVs. On the one hand, attitude polarization 
and subjective ambivalence showed a dissensus effects. That is, participants showed less polarization 
and more conflicted thoughts and feelings when the topic was framed as divisive. There was also 
some evidence for a similar effect in potential ambivalence and number of arguments generated, 
although these were less compelling. However, counter to predictions, there was no evidence for an 
influence of dissensus on proportion of supportive arguments or attitude certainty. The effects which 
did emerge were much more apparent in the analyses which used attachment as a measure of social 
motivation; when using the priming task as a predictor, the dissensus effects were only significant in 
the simpler models. As such, the discussion below will focus on the version of the analysis which 
uses attachment as a moderator. 
There was good evidence that framing an issue as divisive led participants to depolarize their 
attitudes (Table 3.2). Across the simplest three versions of the model, the main effect of dissensus 
was significant or marginally significant. In the final model, the three-way interaction between 
dissensus, the attachment self-model and attitude extremity was significant. A test in the increase in 
R
2
 revealed this more complex model to be a significantly better fit than the simpler models. Plotting 
this interaction revealed that the dissensus effect was most notable for insecure participants with 
extreme attitudes (Figure 3.1). Both these conditions fit with my predictions. First, an insecure 
attachment style should intensify the dissensus effect, because it indicates a high level of social 
motivation. Second, the depolarization effect should be stronger for those with initially extreme 
attitudes as they have further to move to get to attitude neutrality.  
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There was also good evidence that framing an issue as divisive lead to a greater sense of 
subjective ambivalence (α = .86; Table 3.6). Models 1 and 2 show a main effect of dissensus, such 
that participants felt more subjective ambivalence when the issue was framed as divisive (these 
effects were significant and marginally significant for Models 1 and 2 respectively). This effect 
remained significant in Model 3, which also showed a marginally significant interaction between 
dissensus and the other-dimension model of attachment. The direction of the coefficient shows that 
participants insecure on the attachment measure showed a stronger dissensus effect than those who 
were more secure, an effect shown graphically in Figure 3.1. The overall increase in R
2
 associated 
with this model was marginally significant. Finally, adding the final set of interactions in Model 4 did 
not lead to a significant increase in fit. As such, there was good evidence for a main effect of 
dissensus on subjective ambivalence, and some evidence for this effect being stronger for those who 
are insecure on the other-model dimension of attachment.    
There were suggestions of dissensus effects in other outcomes, but this evidence was not as 
compelling. First, the overall number of arguments generated showed a marginal two-way interaction 
between dissensus and the other-model dimension of attachment, qualified by a marginal three-way 
interaction with attitude extremity (Table 3.3, Models 3 & 4). Neither of these models (or, for that 
matter, any of the more simple ones which preceded them) was associated with a significant increase 
in R
2
. Furthermore, plotting out the interaction (Figure 3.2) shows that it is actually securely attached 
people with extreme attitudes who are showing a notable dissensus effect.  As such, these effects are 
of questionable reliability, and do not fit well with findings on the role of attachment in other 
outcomes (in both Studies 1 & 2). . Second, potential ambivalence showed a significant three-way 
interaction between dissensus, attitude extremity, and the self-model of attachment (Table 3.5, 
Models 3 & 4). As shown in Figure 3.2, this interaction was in line with the findings in 
depolarization. Framing a topic as divisive led to high levels of potential ambivalence, but only for 
participants who were insecure on the self-model of attachment and who had extreme attitudes. This 
finding therefore supported the results in polarization. However, there was no main effect of 
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dissensus in any of these models, the increase in R
2
 associated with the final model was non- 
significant, and none of the simpler versions of the model were associated with a significant increase 
in R
2
. As such, this effect is somewhat tenuous.  
An unexpected effect: Social goals and attitude extremity 
 Across a number of variables, there was evidence of an interaction between attitude extremity 
and the social goal manipulation. This interaction had the same basic form across attitude certainty (α 
= .90; Table 3.7, Version A, Model 3) and the two ambivalence measures (potential and subjective; 
Tables 3.5 & 3.6, Version A, Models 3 & 4 respectively). The interactions in these variables are 
plotted in Figure 3.3. In the individual prime condition, attitude extremity was associated with 
stronger attitudes (i.e., participants with more extreme initial attitudes showed greater certainty and 
less ambivalence). In the social goal prime condition, this relationship was eliminated (for certainty) 
or reversed (for the ambivalence measures). Put simply, being socially motivated undermined the 
tendency for people with more extreme attitudes to be more certain of their views, and actually 
seemed to make people with extreme attitudes more ambivalent. For subjective ambivalence this 
effect was qualified by an interaction with social opinion, such that it was strongest when participants 
thought they were in the minority. These effects did not reach full significance; for certainty, the 
effect was marginal, whereas for the two ambivalence measures the effect was significant but the 
increase in R
2
 associated with the block was marginal. However, given that the study was not 
designed to test for this effect, the convergence of results is notable. 
 In interpreting these effects, it is important to take account of whether the prime affected the 
initial level of attitude extremity. The initial attitude measure came after the prime (although before 
the social opinion manipulation), and as such it is plausible that the prime could have had a causal 
effect on attitude extremity (complicating interpretation of interactions between the two). However, 
there was no evidence for such a causal effect. Extremity was higher after the social prime (M = 1.25) 
than after the individual prime (M = 1.09), but this effect was non-significant, t (145) = -0.60, p = .55. 
As such, the prime and attitude extremity can be seen as independent predictors.    
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 A further question is whether the effects of the prime are best explained in terms of sociality 
or positive affect. While the priming manipulation was intended to activate social motivations, the 
specific primes used could also have activated more general positive vs. negative feelings. In the 
current data, the only measures relevant to this question are the sociality and positivity items in the 
manipulation check. Given that the prime did not affect these measures, as well as the more general 
issue of whether implicit goal activation bypasses conscious motivation, this was not an ideal test. It 
did, however, provide an initial check on plausible meditational mechanisms. 
To test the possible mediation of the prime effects by sociality and positivity, two models 
were fitted to each DV. The first model was a simplified version of the main analytic model, 
including only the terms relevant to the current question (i.e., prime, attitude extremity, and their 
interaction). This simplified model was sufficient to replicate the interactions from the original 
analyses, Bs = 0.39, 0.37, -0.32, ps = .03, .05, .06, for potential ambivalence, subjective ambivalence, 
and certainty respectively.   
The second model added self-reported sociality, self-reported positivity, and their two-way 
interactions with attitude extremity. If the effect of the prime can be reduced to self-reported sociality 
or positivity, then entering these additional predictors should eliminate the original interaction. This 
was not the case; for all three DVs, the prime by attitude extremity interaction remained significant, 
Bs = 0.38, 0.51, -0.41, ps = .05, .01, .02, (in the same order as above). Furthermore, the only 
significant interaction between the self report variables and attitude extremity was in the opposite 
direction to the prime effect. More specifically, self-reported sociality showed a negative interaction 
with attitude extremity in predicting subjective ambivalence, B = -0.25, p = .03, such that feeling 
social actually intensified the tendency for more extreme attitudes to be less ambivalent. None of the 
other interactions of sociality or positivity with attitude extremity were significant, ps > .14. As such, 
the effects of the prime cannot be reduced to (accessible and reportable) feelings of sociality or 
positivity. 
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Discussion 
 Overall, the evidence for a dissensus effect on cognitive responses was not strong. 
Polarization and subjective ambivalence showed dissensus effects, but there were not clear effects on 
other variables. In the absence of clear evidence for reduced or biased thought, the effect on 
polarization and subjective ambivalence could be interpreted in terms of a conciliatory social style. 
That is to say, rather than seeking rapid cognitive closure, participants were committing themselves to 
a flexible conversational position which would make it easier to interact with others of a wide range 
of opinions. Thus, they move themselves towards a neutral position and declare themselves open to 
alternative viewpoints (although it does not seem they have actually thought through these alternative 
views any more, as shown by the lack of effect on balance of arguments or potential ambivalence). 
The dissensus effects only emerged when attachment style was used as a measure of social 
motivation. When the priming task was used, the evidence for the dissensus effects was virtually non-
existent. As the primes did have a reliable moderating effect on other predictors (namely, attitude 
extremity), it is hard to explain the lack of an interaction with dissensus as a failure of the 
manipulation as in Study 1. This is compatible with the null results in the manipulation check, as 
implicit goal activation can have effects which are not accessible to self-report (e.g., Aarts, Gollwitzer 
& Hassin, 2004; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001; Eitam, Hassin & Schul, 
2008) . As such, the finding that the priming task did not moderate the dissensus effect cannot be 
attributed to an ineffective manipulation. Rather, social goal priming and attachment style seem to be 
fundamentally different constructs, which are driving different effects. The potential difference 
between the two constructs will be taken up in the next chapter. 
 It is encouraging that the priming variable moderated the effect of attitude extremity. First, as 
mentioned above, this interaction validates the priming manipulation. The fact the task reliably 
moderated the effect of another variable shows that it is having a consistent and detectable effect. 
Second, this interaction testifies to the role of social motivations in attitudinal processes. When 
people are not socially motivated, holding an extreme attitude is associated with feeling certain of 
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one’s position and not seeing the other side. When people are more socially motivated, however, then 
holding a more extreme attitude is associated with no greater certainty and an increased tendency to 
see the other side of the issue. Social motivations disrupt the relationship between different aspects of 
attitude strength, at least when the idea of discussing a topic is made salient. Thus, while this 
interaction does not involve social opinion, it does fit well with the broader theoretical framework; 
the social challenges associated with talking about issues can change people’s opinions on these 
issues.  
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Endnotes 
1
Participants also rated their arguments for strength. Both versions of the analysis were run on this 
variable, and none of the models were associated with a significant increase in R
2
. As this outcome 
was not central to the current argument, it will not be discussed further.  
 
2
Participants also completed a measure of how much they had thought about the issues before coming 
to the study (initial elaboration, measured on a 5-point scale), and an 18-item measure of tendency to 
invest effort in thought (need for cognition; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Initial elaboration was 
generally low, with 127 participants rating themselves on the lowest two points about the scale (not at 
all; somewhat). Need for cognition was primarily collected as it was plausibly an additional source of 
variability in performance on the argument task, and hence controlling for it would increase statistical 
power. However, adding this predictor to the analyses of the argument task variables (number of 
arguments generated and proportion of supportive arguments) did not significantly increase R
2
 and so 
it will not be discussed further.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
General discussion 
 
Overall, these studies offered mixed support for my hypotheses. On the one hand, the basic 
dissensus effect on affect was replicated, and there was evidence for the predicted moderation by 
adult attachment. On the other hand, there was no evidence for moderation by social goals, and the 
predicted cognitive avoidance did not clearly emerge. These results will first be discussed in more 
detail, then two broad aspects of the findings will be examined directly (specifically, the divergence 
between the attachment measure and social goal manipulations, and the consequences of the 
dissensus effect). 
The current findings: Dissensus, social motivation, and cognitive consequences 
First, the basic dissensus effect was replicated in the current research. In the first study, 
participants felt more anxiety when thinking about discussing divisive topics. Furthermore, this effect 
could not be explained in terms of individual attitude extremity or general negativity, replicating 
findings from the initial studies. In Study 2, there was a notable dissensus effect in attitude 
polarization and subjective ambivalence, such that participants were more likely to move towards 
neutrality and feel conflicted when thinking about discussing a divisive topic. This not only 
demonstrates a dissensus effect on a new set of responses, it was also found using a novel 
manipulation of consensus. Thus, the current data offers excellent support for the initial studies; 
dissensus has widespread and robust effects.  
The role of social motivations was less clear. On the one hand, there was robust moderation 
of the dissensus effects by the self-model of attachment. Participants who were more insecure about 
their self-worth showed a greater anxiety response to divisive issues, as well as greater attitudinal 
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depolarization. The other-model dimension had less straightforward effects; there was some evidence 
that this variable moderated subjective ambivalence and thought generation responses, but the 
evidence for these effects was not as strong. As such, it seems that people’s dispositional social 
orientation does moderate responses to social division in the predicted fashion, and that feelings of 
self-worth are a stronger and more robust determinant of these responses than distrust of others.  
However, the social goal manipulations did not show the predicted intensification of the 
dissensus effects. In neither study did participants whose social goals were activated show a greater 
dissensus response. In the first study, this was plausibly due to a manipulation failure. In the second, 
however, there was good evidence that the manipulation was effective; in particular, the priming task 
showed a reliable and consistent interaction with attitude extremity. Thus, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the priming task did not moderate responses in the same way attachment did. Possible 
reasons for this discrepancy (and the implications for understanding the causal mechanism of the 
effect) will be discussed in the following section.  
 Finally, there was not good evidence for cognitive avoidance of divisive topics. There was a 
dissensus effect on attitude polarization and subjective ambivalence, such that divisive topics made 
people move their attitudes towards neutrality and feel more torn between the alternative viewpoints. 
There was also some suggestion of a dissensus effect on number of arguments generated and potential 
ambivalence, but these latter findings were not compelling. In light of the null effect in many 
variables, an overall cognitive avoidance of the issue does not seem plausible. While the effects found 
were consistent with cognitive avoidance, they are just as plausibly explained as a more conciliatory 
social style; social division leading participants to adopt a more flexible conversational position.  
Themes of results: Social motivation and cognitive avoidance 
Social concern: The complexity of social motivation  
 Perhaps the most surprising feature of these results was the discrepancy between the two 
operationalizations of social motivation. While attachment insecurity intensified the dissensus effect 
as predicted, experimentally activating social goals did not. In the face of these findings, it is hard to 
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maintain the idea that the two tasks are both operationalizations of the same underlying variable. 
Rather, it seems they are two different constructs. Thus, social motivation proves to be a more 
complex and multifaceted concept than originally conceived.  
One possible way to characterize the difference between these two constructs is that goal 
priming is purely motivational, whereas attachment captures beliefs about the self and others (i.e., the 
internal working model of relationships). This conceptualization would imply that the dissensus effect 
is driven more by beliefs about interpersonal episodes than by the desire to have smooth interactions. 
To illustrate this point, imagine modeling aversion to negative social outcomes in an expectancy-
value framework. The probability of such outcomes would be linked to beliefs about the nature of 
people and interactions (determined in part by internal working model of relationships), whereas the 
aversion to them would be linked to the desire to avoid negative outcomes (determined in part by 
social goals). Roughly speaking, attachment style is linked to expectancy, whereas goal activation is 
linked to value. As such, participants with active social goals may have valued a smooth interaction 
more, but this effect is dwarfed by the differences in how probable they saw negative social outcomes 
as being (determined by attachment).  
 Alternatively, the differential roles of social goal priming and attachment may be due to the 
difference between approach and avoidance motivation. Being socially motivated is ambiguous; it 
could mean striving to achieve all the positive outcomes which could come from social interactions, 
but it could also mean desiring to avoid all the negative outcomes which could come from 
interactions. While these may sound redundant, psychologically they are two very different 
motivational states; note that being purely approach motivated would lead people to engage in every 
possible interaction (even if the probability of conflict was extremely high), whereas pure avoidance 
motivation would lead people to refuse to engage in any interaction (even if the possibility of it being 
positive was very high). Given the proposed causal mechanism, the dissensus effect should be linked 
to avoidance motivation; it stems from the desire to avoid negative social outcomes. Thus, the 
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difference between the attachment measure and the goal priming could be due to the priming task 
affecting approach motivation, but the attachment measure being linked to avoidance motivation. 
Cognitive avoidance and the consequences of dissensus  
 As outlined above, there was not compelling evidence of cognitive avoidance of divisive 
topics; while discussing divisive topics does make people feel more threatened and move their 
attitudes towards neutrality, there was not strong evidence for reduced or more biased thought about 
these topics. One possible conclusion from this is that the dissensus effect is of little practical 
significance; while divisive topics do make people feel threatened, this affective response does not 
have much bearing on opinions about the topic. Another possible conclusion is that the procedure 
used in the current experiment is too detached from actual interactions; while the imagined 
discussions in the current study are sufficient to show affective consequences, an actual interaction 
would be required to find effects on more substantive variables. I would suggest that while there may 
be some truth to these charges, they both over-state their case. On the one hand, while the current data 
do suggest that it would be fruitful to look beyond private cognition, this does not mean there are no 
important consequences of the dissensus effect. On the other, while the current procedure may neglect 
certain features of actual interactions, it may be that these features can be manipulated within the 
context of individual participants imagining or anticipating talking with others. 
 One possibility, consistent with the current findings, is that dissensus gives rise to social 
(rather than cognitive) avoidance. Rather than examining the consequences of discussions on private 
thought, it might be more fruitful to examine the effects of social division on interactional styles. If 
knowing that a discussion topic splits societal opinion changes the ways in which people interact with 
others, this is likely to have important consequences for the degree to which information spreads 
through society and the degree to which people hear diverse viewpoints.  
 This social avoidance could manifest in different ways. On the one hand, people might show 
compensatory sociality. When interacting on a difficult topic, the potential disruption to interpersonal 
relationships might motivate people to be particularly solicitous and accommodating towards their 
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interaction partners. This would explain the attitudinal depolarization found in Study 2, and would be 
consistent with the finding that thwarted social goals can motivate affiliative tendencies (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003). However, an alternative response would be reactive hostility. In this case, because 
social goals are threatened, become highly sensitive to negative cues (e.g., Strachman & Gable, 2006) 
and start pursuing alternative goals such as upholding values (Nash, McGregror & Prentice, 2011). 
One plausible moderator of which response style is shown is the perceived possibility of a positive 
interaction. Compensatory sociality would be a plausible response if there seems a reasonable 
probability the interaction could go well (e.g., the partner seems friendly), whereas reactive hostility 
would be more appropriate if the interaction seems likely to go poorly (e.g., if the partner seems 
hostile).   
 Both of these response styles would have important consequences for the discussion of 
divisive topics. Neither mindset is conducive to interaction partners calmly discussing their opinions 
(which may be similar or divergent from one another), identifying points of difference, and ultimately 
finding consensus. However, each response style would disrupt this process in a different way. On the 
one hand, compensatory sociality would lead to an aversion to saying anything about the topic at all; 
given the desire to have a positive interaction, people would be very hesitant to commit to a 
viewpoint or criticize the views of others. On the other hand, reactive hostility would lead to an 
overly combative style, whereby people would become very committed to their own position and very 
inflexible. Thus, an understanding of the interpersonal effects of social dissensus may prove very 
important to promoting the successful resolution of difficult social issues.  
Summary 
In sum, the current studies provide a strong replication of the dissensus effect, some evidence 
for moderation by social motivation, and weak evidence for cognitive avoidance. The basic reasoning 
that divisive topics are socially challenging is strongly supported, suggesting that this line of research 
has identified a real and potentially important social psychological phenomenon. However, the causes 
and consequences of the dissensus effect are less clear than was originally hypothesized. With regard 
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to causes, social motivation proved to be a more complex construct than originally anticipated. With 
regard to consequences, it seems that it may be more fruitful to focus the effect dissensus has on 
social processes rather than private cognition.  
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 2.1. Issue stimuli (Study 1).
 
  
Popular Divisive Unpopular
Safe tap water Affirmative action Social segregation 
Human rights Intelligent design Teenage mothers 
Home privacy Legalizing marijuana Air pollution 
Food safety Health care reform Poverty 
Free speech Stem cell research Racial prejudice 
Supporting veterans Internet pornography Childhood obesity 
Safe sex Abortion High unemployment 
Fair pay Capital punishment Vandalism 
Medical confidentiality Endangered species Drug addiction 
Equal opportunities War in Iraq Slavery 
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Table 2.4. Self-reported sensitivity to controversy scale (Study 1). 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please use the scale to indicate how true they are of you.
You will be given a series of statements.
When people have different opinions on an issue, it makes me feel interested in thinking about the 
issue.
I feel intrigued when people have different opinions.
I feel bored when everyone is in agreement.
I am at my least interested when everybody has the same opinion. 
Not at all 
like me
Very much 
like me
I am at my most relaxed when people have the same opinion.
I feel calm when everyone is in agreement.
I feel tense and uncomfortable when people have different opinions. 
When people have different opinions on an issue, thinking about the issue makes me feel anxious.
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Table 3.2. Regression analysis of effects of social opinion, attitude extremity, and social motivation 
(goal prime, adult attachment) on attitudinal polarization (Study 2). 
 
Intercept -0.15 -0.16 -0.03 0.04
Prime (0=Individual, 1=Prosocial) -0.08 -0.06 0.13 0.06
Opinion support (Social support, linear) -0.03 0.08 0.08 -0.14
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.11 * -0.09 -0.07 -0.10
Prime x Opinion support -0.21 -0.09 0.12
Prime x Dissensus -0.05 -0.03 0.07
Attitude extremity -0.12 Ϯ -0.19 *
Prime x Attitude extremity -0.14 -0.05
Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.22 *
Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.03
Prime x Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.25
Prime x Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.09
Intercept -0.19 ** -0.19 ** 0.07 0.09
AS (Attachment self-model) -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00
AO (Attachment other-model) -0.03 Ϯ -0.04 Ϯ -0.02 -0.01
Opinion support (Social support, linear) -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.04
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.11 * -0.11 * -0.08 Ϯ -0.05
AS x Opinion support -0.02 -0.02 -0.05
AO x Opinion support 0.00 0.00 0.00
AS x Dissensus 0.00 -0.01 0.02
AO x Dissensus -0.01 0.00 0.01
Attitude extremity -0.25 *** -0.27 ***
AS x Attitude extremity -0.03 * -0.03 *
AO x Attitude extremity -0.01 -0.01
Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.08
Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.05
AS x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.03
AO x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.00
AS x Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.02 *
AO x Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.01
N.B. Ϯ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  <.001
Version A: Prime (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .03 ΔR 2  = .01 ΔR 2  = .13 *** ΔR 2  = .03
Version B: Attachment (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2  = .06 Ϯ ΔR 2  = .01 ΔR 2  = .17 *** ΔR 2  = .08 *
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Table 3.3. Regression analysis of effects of social opinion, attitude extremity, and social motivation 
(goal prime, adult attachment) on number of arguments generated (Study 2). 
 
Intercept 5.04 *** 5.07 *** 5.29 *** 5.23 ***
Prime (0=Individual, 1=Prosocial) 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.51
Opinion support (Social support, linear) 0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.17
Prime x Opinion support 0.34 0.46 0.30
Prime x Dissensus 0.01 -0.02 -0.03
Attitude extremity -0.20 -0.11
Prime x Attitude extremity -0.07 -0.35
Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.00
Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.17
Prime x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.15
Prime x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.01
Intercept 5.16 *** 5.18 *** 5.45 *** 5.47 ***
AS (Attachment self-model) -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02
AO (Attachment other-model) -0.10 * -0.11 * -0.15 * -0.15 *
Opinion support (Social support, linear) 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.07
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 0.09
AS x Opinion support 0.04 0.04 -0.01
AO x Opinion support -0.08 -0.08 -0.10
AS x Dissensus 0.03 0.03 -0.01
AO x Dissensus -0.07 Ϯ -0.08 Ϯ -0.13 *
Attitude extremity -0.29 * -0.31 Ϯ
AS x Attitude extremity -0.03 -0.05
AO x Attitude extremity 0.04 0.03
Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.02
Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.15
AS x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.04
AO x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.02
AS x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.04
AO x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.05 Ϯ
N.B. Ϯ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  <.001
R
2
 = .04 ΔR 2  = .04 ΔR 2  = .03 ΔR 2  =  .06
Version A: Prime (n = 143)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .01 ΔR 2  = .01 ΔR 2  = .03 ΔR 2  = .03
Version B: Attachment (n = 143)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Table 3.4. Regression analysis of effects of social opinion, attitude extremity, and social motivation 
(goal prime, adult attachment) on proportion of attitude-supportive arguments generated (Study 2). 
 
Intercept 0.59 *** 0.58 *** 0.56 *** 0.56 ***
Prime (0=Individual, 1=Prosocial) -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04
Opinion support (Social support, linear) -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Prime x Opinion support -0.10 * -0.12 ** -0.10 Ϯ
Prime x Dissensus 0.00 0.01 -0.01
Attitude extremity 0.02 0.03
Prime x Attitude extremity 0.02 0.03
Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.01
Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.01
Prime x Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.02
Prime x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.01
Intercept 0.58 *** 0.58 *** 0.56 *** 0.55 ***
AS (Attachment self-model) -0.01 Ϯ -0.01 0.00 0.00
AO (Attachment other-model) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Opinion support (Social support, linear) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
AS x Opinion support 0.00 0.00 0.00
AO x Opinion support 0.00 0.00 0.00
AS x Dissensus 0.00 0.00 -0.01
AO x Dissensus 0.00 0.00 0.00
Attitude extremity 0.02 0.03 Ϯ
AS x Attitude extremity 0.00 0.00
AO x Attitude extremity 0.00 0.00
Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.02
Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.01
AS x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.00
AO x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.00
AS x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.00
AO x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.00
N.B. Ϯ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  <.001
Version A: Prime (n = 141)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .02 ΔR 2  =  .04 * ΔR 2  = .05 * ΔR 2  = .01
Version B: Attachment (n = 141)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .04 ΔR 2  = .00 ΔR 2  = .03 ΔR 2  = .03
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Table 3.5. Regression analysis of effects of social opinion, attitude extremity, and social motivation 
(goal prime, adult attachment) on potential ambivalence (Study 2). 
 
Intercept 3.12 *** 3.15 *** 3.45 *** 3.49 ***
Prime (0=Individual, 1=Prosocial) 0.00 -0.03 -0.46 -0.55
Opinion support (Social support, linear) -0.18 -0.39 -0.39 -0.59 Ϯ
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) 0.08 -0.09 -0.06 0.01
Prime x Opinion support 0.38 0.33 0.75 Ϯ
Prime x Dissensus 0.33 Ϯ 0.29 0.13
Attitude extremity -0.27 Ϯ -0.29 Ϯ
Prime x Attitude extremity 0.38 * 0.49 *
Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.21
Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.05
Prime x Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.42
Prime x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.09
Intercept 3.12 *** 3.10 *** 3.08 *** 3.05 ***
AS (Attachment self-model) 0.08 * 0.09 * 0.04 0.05
AO (Attachment other-model) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Opinion support (Social support, linear) -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
AS x Opinion support -0.08 -0.08 Ϯ -0.06
AO x Opinion support -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
AS x Dissensus -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 *
AO x Dissensus -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
Attitude extremity 0.07 0.08
AS x Attitude extremity 0.05 Ϯ 0.05
AO x Attitude extremity -0.02 -0.02
Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.04
Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.04
AS x Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.02
AO x Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.01
AS x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.04 *
AO x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.03
N.B. Ϯ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  <.001
Version A: Prime (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .01 ΔR 2  = .03 ΔR 2  = .03 Ϯ ΔR 2  = .03
Version B: Attachment (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .05 ΔR 2  = .03 ΔR2  = .03 ΔR 2  = .07
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Table 3.6. Regression analysis of effects of social opinion, attitude extremity, and social motivation 
(goal prime, adult attachment) on subjective ambivalence (Study 2). 
 
Intercept 5.09 *** 5.10 *** 5.37 *** 5.41 ***
Prime (0=Individual, 1=Prosocial) -0.44 -0.44 -0.88 * -1.05 **
Opinion support (Social support, linear) 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) 0.18 Ϯ 0.22 0.25 Ϯ 0.12
Prime x Opinion support 0.04 -0.02 0.45
Prime x Dissensus -0.09 -0.13 -0.04
Attitude extremity -0.25 Ϯ -0.31 Ϯ
Prime x Attitude extremity 0.38 * 0.69 **
Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.01
Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.11
Prime x Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.54 Ϯ
Prime x Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.17
Intercept 4.87 *** 4.88 *** 4.84 *** 4.78 ***
AS (Attachment self-model) 0.09 * 0.09 * 0.03 0.04
AO (Attachment other-model) 0.02 0.03 0.09 Ϯ 0.08
Opinion support (Social support, linear) 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.37
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) 0.20 * 0.20 Ϯ 0.21 * 0.16
AS x Opinion support 0.02 0.02 0.00
AO x Opinion support -0.01 0.00 -0.02
AS x Dissensus -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
AO x Dissensus 0.04 0.06 Ϯ 0.02
Attitude extremity 0.12 0.17
AS x Attitude extremity 0.06 * 0.06 Ϯ
AO x Attitude extremity -0.05 -0.07 Ϯ
Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.18
Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.03
AS x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.00
AO x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.02
AS x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.02
AO x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.03
N.B. Ϯ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  <.001
Version A: Prime (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .04 ΔR 2  = .00 ΔR 2  = .03 ΔR 2  = .05 Ϯ
Version B: Attachment (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .08 * ΔR 2  = .03 ΔR 2  = .05 Ϯ ΔR 2  = .03
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Table 3.7. Regression analysis of effects of social opinion, attitude extremity, and social motivation 
(goal prime, adult attachment) on attitude certainty (Study 2). 
 
Intercept 5.18 *** 5.20 *** 4.79 *** 4.71 ***
Prime (0=Individual, 1=Prosocial) 0.44 Ϯ 0.41 0.77 * 0.90 **
Opinion support (Social support, linear) 0.01 -0.13 -0.13 -0.04
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.10
Prime x Opinion support 0.27 0.25 0.00
Prime x Dissensus -0.02 0.02 -0.22
Attitude extremity 0.38 ** 0.48 **
Prime x Attitude extremity -0.33 Ϯ -0.54 *
Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.09
Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.15
Prime x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.30
Prime x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.24 Ϯ
Intercept 5.41 *** 5.40 *** 5.20 *** 5.19 ***
AS (Attachment self-model) -0.07 * -0.07 * -0.05 -0.04
AO (Attachment other-model) -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
Opinion support (Social support, linear) -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06
Dissensus (Social support, quadratic) -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06
AS x Opinion support -0.01 -0.01 0.00
AO x Opinion support 0.01 0.01 0.01
AS x Dissensus 0.02 0.02 0.01
AO x Dissensus -0.01 -0.02 0.02
Attitude extremity 0.17 Ϯ 0.17
AS x Attitude extremity -0.01 -0.02
AO x Attitude extremity 0.01 0.02
Attitude extremity x Opinion support -0.02
Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.01
AS x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.00
AO x Attitude extremity x Opinion support 0.00
AS x Attitude extremity x Dissensus 0.01
AO x Attitude extremity x Dissensus -0.03
N.B. Ϯ p  < .10; * p  < .05; ** p  < .01; *** p  <.001
Version A: Prime (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .02 ΔR 2  = .01 ΔR 2  = .06 * ΔR 2  = .03
Version B: Attachment (n = 147)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R
2
 = .04 ΔR 2  = .01 ΔR2 = .03 ΔR 2  = .02
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Figure 1.1. The dissensus effect (a predicted quadratic relationship between perceived social opinion 
and threat in discussions). 
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Figure 1.2. The proposed model. Social division is hypothesized to increase threat and cognitive 
avoidance, an effect which will be intensified by higher levels of social motivation. 
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Figure 2.1. Interaction of attachment self-model and dissensus in determining anxiety (Study 1). 
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Figure 3.1. Dissensus effects in attitude polarization and subjective ambivalence (Study 2). 
 
 
 N.B. Attachment variables plotted at +1 / -1 SD from the mean. Attitude extremity plotted at the 
extremes of the scale. 
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Figure 3.2. Dissensus effects in number of arguments generated and potential ambivalence (Study 2).  
 
 
N.B. Attachment variables plotted at +1 / -1 SD from the mean. Attitude extremity plotted at the 
extremes of the scale. 
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Figure 3.3. Interaction of goal priming task and attitude extremity in predicting potential 
ambivalence, subjective ambivalence, and attitude certainty (Study 2).  
  
N.B. Attitude extremity plotted at the extremes of the scale.  
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